International Patenting and Technology Diffusion by Jonathan Eaton & Samuel Kortum





Working Paper No. 4931




We have benefited from discussions with David Andolfatto, John Helliwell, Stephen Parente,
Jonathan Putnam, and Ed Roman. Earlier versions were presented at the NBER, the Winter
Meetings of the Econometric Society, Northeastern University, the North East Universities
Development Conference, CEPREMAP, the University of Western Ontario, and Princeton
University. Akiko Tamura provided excellent research assistance. We take responsibility for any
errors. We gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Science Foundation under Grant
No. SBR 9309935-001. This paper is part of NBER's research programs in Growth, International
Trade and Investment, and Productivity. Any opinions expressed are those of the authors and
not those of the Federal Reserve System or the National Bureau of Economic Research.
© 1994 by Jonathan Eaton and Samuel Kortum. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,





We model the invention of new technologies and their diffusion across countries. Our
model predicts that, eventually, all countries will grow at the same rate, with each country's
productivity ranking determined by how rapidly it adopts inventions. The common growth rate
depends on research efforts in all countries, while research effort is determined by how much
inventions earn at home and abroad. Patents affect the return to invention. We relate the
decision to patent an invention internationally to the cost of patenting in a country and to the
expected value of patent protection in that country. We can thus infer the direction and
magnitude of the international diffusion of technology from data on international patenting,
productivity, and research. We fit the model to data from the five leading research economies.
The parameters indicate how much tech logy flows between these countries and how much each
country earns from its inventions domestically and elsewhere. Our results imply that foreign
countries are important sources of technology even though countries earn most of their return to
innovation at home. For example, about half of U.S. productivity growth derives from foreign
technology yet U.S. investors earn 98 per cent of the revenue from their inventions domestically.
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A basic question is the role of technology in explaining productivity differences across countries.
One hypothesis is that technology is highly mobile across borders while capital is not. The
implication is that capital investment rather than technology explains differences in per capita
income. Another hypothesis is that capital is highly mobile internationally while countries are
slow to adopt foreign technology. In this case income differences derive from differences in the
rate at which different countries innovate and adopt inventions from elsewhere.2 To assess the
plausibility and quantitative implications of this second hypothesis we develop and implement
empirically a model of how and where inventions occur, how they diffuse domestically and
internationally, and how they give rise to increases in productivity.
While economists have devoted substantial attention to measuring the degree of capital
mobility internationally, less is known about the international mobility of technology. The
problem is observing the creation of knowledge and its diffusion over time and across space.3
In this paper we exploit data on international patenting and research effort to infer the sources
'Barro and Xala-I-Martin (1992) and Mankiw, Romer, end Weil (1992) pursue the empirical implications
of this hypothesis. Several puzzles are that: (1) the implied values of capitals share and of interestrate
differentialsare implausibly large; (ii) levels of income per capita converge at rates that are too slow given
r.asonahle parameter values; (iii) the growth rates of total factor productivity, which take capital accumulation
into account, continue to exhibit convergence (Downick and Nguyen (1989) and HelliweU and Chung (1991));
(iv) technology appears to diffuse more rapidly domestically than acrce borders (Lichtenherg(1992)).
2Gerschenkron (1962) interprets the comparative experiences of different European countries and Japan
duringtheirindustrial revolutions in terms of the diffusion of technology. Nelson and Phelps (1966), KrugTnan
(1979),Connulka(1990),Groesmenand Helpinan (1991),Segeratrom(1991), Young (1993),and Parentsaix!
Prescott (1994), among others, provide alternative formalizations of international diffusion. Groarnsn and
Helpman (1994), Fagerbeng (1994), and Dinopoulos (1994) survey the literature.
3Neverthelees, Pavitt and Soete (1982), Fagerberg (1987), Benhabib and Spiegel (1992), Coe and Help-
man (1993), and Evenson and Englander (1994) estimate international technology diffusion using alternative
approaches. We depart from these other studies in embedding technological diffusion, endogenous research
activity, and the patenting decision into an intertemporal general equilibrium framework.
Iand the spread of technological progress. Data on employment of R&D scientists and engineers
provide a measure of the inputs used to invent while data on international pnting indicate
where inventions occur and where their inventors think they might be adopted. However,
patenting measures technology diffusion only imperfectly and indirectly: Many inventions are
not patented at all, or at least not patented everywhere they are used, while many ideas that
are patented never constitute significant innovations. Moreover, the costs of patenting and the
benefit of protection vary across countries, both because of differences in patent laws and the
strength of protection, and because of differences in market size.4
To address these problems we incorporate the inventor's decision to patent in different
countries into a model of research and technology diffusion. The model identifies features of
an invention and characteristics of national economies and patent systems that determine the
return to patenting. We can thus isolate the role of technology diffusion in the patenting
decision.
In our model, production in each country, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), uses a fixed
continuum of inputs to make a homogeneous output. Researchers in each country search for
inputs of higher quality that potentially can be used anywhere in the world. We follow Kortum
(1994) in assuming that researchers draw from a given distribution of ideas of different quality.
Variation in the quality of ideas explains why inventors seek patent protection for some ideas
in many countries while others are protected in only one country or not at all.5
Ideas are adopted in different countries with a lag that can vary according both to where
the idea originates and to where it is used.6 Since the processes of invention and of production
are intimately linked, the diffusion of ideas domestically may be much more rapid than their
4Penrcu.pe (1951) provides the claa.ic diacua.Ion of t& international patenting eysteni.
5Putnam (1993) finds that, of Inventions that are patented in at least one country, 72 per cent are patented
oaly there while 18 per cent are patented in three or more countnea.
Abramovitz (1992) describes the ease with which countries can adopt each other'. technologies in terms of
their degree of "technological congruence".
2diffusion across borders, but our model does not impose this ordering a priori.
An idea constitutes an innovation i.n a country if it surpasses the state of the art there. As
the distribution of technology in a country advances, a smaller fraction of ideas are innovations.
An implication is that a less inventive country will eventually grow at the same rate as more
inventive ones since it is able to draw more innovations from the "technology gap" between
itself and others. The technology gaps between countries that sustain a common growth rate
determine long-run relative productivity levels.
We incorporate the patenting decision into our model of invention and diffusion as follows:
We assume that if an idea constitutes an innovation in a country then the inventor appropriates
the rent it earns there as long as (1) no better invention has rendered it obsolete and (2) it
has not been successfully imitated. Patent protection reduces the hazard of imitation. It need
not provide perfect protection from imitation, nor is imitation necessarily immediate if the
inventor fails to patent.
The rate at which an idea diffuses to a country is unaffected by the inventor's decision to
patent there. At the same time, more rapid diffusion into a country increases the incentive to
patent there since the rewards will be achieved sooner. Patent protection nevertheless does
have real effects in that it influences the return to R&D.
At the time of invention, the inventor knows the absolute quality of the idea but not how
much, if any, it advances the state of the art in different countries. Hence the inventor must
decide whether or not to apply for a patent in a country without knowing how much the idea
will ever earn there. Inventors will patent some ideas widely and others in few places, or
nowhere at all. Some unpatented ideas may someday significantly advance the state of the
art, while some widely-patented ideas will turn out to be duds. An inventor will seek wider
protection for a high-quality idea, since it is more likely to be an innovation.
Our model identifies market size, the cost of patenting, the strength of intellectual property
protection, the average level of productivity, and, most critical for our analysis, the speed at
3which the country can absorb ideas into its technology as characteristics of a country relevant
to the patent decision.7
We fit the steady state of our model to data on growth, relative productivities, research
scientists and engineers, and international patenting from the five major research economies:
France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We decompose growth
in output per worker in each of the five countries into what is contributed by innovations
from each of the five. We also decompose earnings from innovations in each country into
what emanates from each of the five. We find that foreign countries are important sources of
technology even though countries earn most of their return to innovation domestically. For
example, nearly half of U.S. productivity growth derives from foreign technology. Nevertheless,
U.S. inventors earn 98 per cent of the revenues from their inventions at home, We conclude
with several simulation experiments. Eliminating diffusion between the United States and the
rest of the world, for example, would lower world growth by almost half a percentage point
and leave the United States far behind the other four. At the other extreme, if diffusion were
as rapid between countries as within them then world growth would be 2.3 percentage points
higher than the base case level. We find that patent protection has only a modest impact on
growth.
We proceed as follows: In section 2 below we present the model and then, in section 3,
characterize its steady state. In section 4 we parameterize the steady state with data from
the five leading research economies. In section 5 we decompose the sources of growth and the
returns to innovation among these countries, and offer the results of the simulation of several
alternative scenarios that allow for different rates of international technology diffusion and
TAs we diacuwd, en idea I. more likelytosdw. the state 01 the art in a country wheie the level of
productivity is low. This does not mean th&taninventor Ia necessarily more likely to apply for protection in a
poor country, however. A country is likely to be poor precisely because it adopts innovations slowly, reducing
the return to patenting there.
4different levels of intellectual property protection. Section 6 offers some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Since our model is intricate, we review its components before describing each in detaiL Pro-
duction of output, described in section 2.1, combines a continuum of inputs of varying quality,
which are themselves produced by labor. An alternative activity for workers is doing research
to come up with ideas for better inputs. Section 2.2 describes how ideas are produced and
how they disseminate. A key variable describing a country at any moment is the stock of
ideas that have reached it up to that point. Our assumptions about production and diffusion
imply a relationship between this stock of knowledge and the distribution of technologies in
the country. Section 2.3 derives this distribution and its dynamics. In 2.4 we show how labor
productivity relates to the stock of ideas through the implied distribution of technologies.
We make assumptions about market structure, with implications for pricing and firm profit,
which we discuss in 2.5. These assumptions also have implications, which we turn to in 2.6,
about the value of having an innovation adopted in a country, depending on whether or not
it is patented. We can thus infer the return to patenting in a country, and relate the decision
to patent an idea to the quality of the idea, the speed of diffusion, the cost of patenting, and
market size. This we do in 2.7. Putting these things together we then calculate, in 2.8, the
the expected value of an idea, incorporating the optimal patenting decision in each country.
The value of ideas determines the return to doing R&D while labor productivity determines
the opportunity cost of this activity. In 2.9 and 2.10 we relate the two to solve for the
equilibrium amount of R&D effort and the wage.
52.1 Production
We consider a world consisting of n =1,... , Ncountries. Output in country n (Y) is pro-
duced by combining intermediate inputs subject to a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas
production function,
ln(Yt/J) =J_1jhi[zntu)x(i)]di,
whereX(j) is the quantity of input jproducedat time tin country n and Z(j) is the quality
of that input. (See the Appendix for a list of symbols.) The range of inputs is fixed over time
and the same across countries. Output is homogeneous and tradable across countries, while
inputs are nontraded.8 We choose units so that to produce any input at rate x requires local
labor services at rate x. Productivity differences across countries result from differences in the
quality of inputs.
Within a country, the quality of inputs improves over time. These improvements derive
from research performed both domestically and abroad.
2.2 Ideas
An idea is our basic unit of research output. While we assume that all workers in each country
are equally productive producing goods, we allow workers to differ in their productivities as
researchers. In particular, we assume that in country n with a total labor force of L, if
workers are ranked according to their productivity as researchers, a worker of rank jproduces
ideas at a stochastic rate antfi(t)'. The parameterreflects the overall productivity
of researchers in country n at time t whilereflects the rate at which research productivity
declines as less talented workers become researchers. We assume that workers are compensated
•By assuming &single,homogeneous tradable output we prevent inventions from having any efft on the
terms of trade between countries. While it would be interesting to consider the implications of invention. for
the terms of trade, we pru1ude the possibility here in order to foct purely on the implications of innovation
for productivity.
6in proportion to their productivity in either production or research. Hence the workers who
are the most productive at doing research will become researchers. Thus if R,, workers in
country n at time t are doing research, they will create ideas at a rate atL'R.
There are several dimensions to an idea: its quality, its sector of use, and the time until it
diffuses to each country. An idea's quality is a random variable Qdrawnfrom the cumulative
distribution function, F(q) =Pr[Q<q]. The quality of an idea is common to all countries to
which it diffuses. We assume a Pareto distribution of qualities, F(q) =1—qB
An idea applies to only one out of the continuum of inputs. The input jtowhich the idea
applies is drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, f].10
Ideas, even good ideas, do not diffuse immediately. Let rbethe random diffusion lag. If
an idea is discovered at time t in country i then it diffuses to country n at time t + r,,,for
n =1,2,...,N. We assume that the marginal distribution of the diffusion lag from country i
to country n is exponential with parameter e,,,i.e.Pr[r ￿ x] =1— Thusis the
speed of diffusion from country i to country n and e' is the mean diffusion lag.
We distinguish between the concepts of diffusion and adoption. While every idea will
eventually diffuse to every other country (if the ,,j's are strictly positive) many ideas will
never be adopted because they are not useful. Some ideas are not useful even when they are
invented while other ideas are no longer useful by the time they have diffused.
9Bental and Peled (1992) and Kortuni (1994) 1o use the Pareto distribution to characterize the pool
of undiscovered techniques from which researchers draw. The Pareto distribution has the convenient feature
that, if we truncate the distribution at some level z, then the random variable Q/z (￿ 1) inherits the Pareto
distribution. Thus, if a new idea is better than current beet practice (say z) then the distribution of the inventive
step (Q/z) does not depend on the level of the best practice that is surpassed
10We ignore the possibility that research could be aimed at improving the quality of a specific input.
72.3 The Technological Frontier
In equilibrium, only the best available idea for each input in each country is actually adopted.
Thus for each country n, Z(j) represents the highest quality idea yet adopted in country ri
in sector jbytime t, so that {ZfltLj)}j[oj1isthe technological frontier in country n at time
t. Consider an idea of quality q in sector jdiscoveredsomewhere at time t.Ifthe idea diffuses
to country n with a lag of r then it will constitute an innovation if and only if q> Z+r(j).
In this case the idea is adopted so that the technological frontier at jjumpsdiscontinuously
from Z+(j) to q.
To derive the dynamics of the technological frontier in a given country, we need to know the
rate at which ideas were discovered in all countries over all of history. Researchers in country
n produce new ideas at a nonstochastic rate Let bethe stochastic rate at
which ideas of a given sector diffuse to country n from all the research that has been done
throughout the world. (The corresponding stock is fJi,,ds.) An idea may be the
result of domestic research or may arrive from some other country It may be the outcome of
research performed recently or years before. Integrating over the appropriately weighted past
research done in country i the stock of ideas flowing into country n's technolo' is, summing
across countriçs,
=r'Jetcr,LR,ds. (1)
Let z denote the level of the technological frontier in a particular sector of country ri.
8Letting H(zIt) Pr[Z,j(j) ￿ z], the distribution of this frontier is:11
H(zIt) (2)
Note that the distribution of the technological frontier depends only on the total stock of ideas
at that time, regardless of when these ideas were adopted for production or where they
came from. This feature of the distribution simplifies the analysis drastically.
2.4 Productivity
Output is maximized when production workers are evenly divided among production of the
individual inputs. In this case labor productivity is the geometric mean of t technological
frontier. Thus, we usedefined by,
1nA, =J/lnZ,4j)dj.
Jo
asan index of productivity in country n.12 Using our result on the distribution of the techno-
logical frontier, we have,
lnA, =
f°°lnzhn(zlt)dz
11ldeas are adopted in eector z at a stochastic rate of jtZ'.Theprobability that no idea is adopted in the





Solvingthis differential equation, with the two initial conditions: (i) lim-._,,, H,(zIa) =1V z1 and (ii)
irs-.p,.. =0, yields the cumulative distribution function for t& tethnological frontier.
12marketstructure that we asmime does not, In fact, imply an even allocation of production workers
among inputs, since the mark-up differs acroes sectors. Productivity is proportional to this index, however, as
can be seen from equation (10) and (11) below.
9where h(zIt)dH,(zjt) = Ojz_(+1)e_t. Solving this integral, as1nt becomes large,
we obtain:
= e"14°, (3)
where, '.5772 isEuler's constant.13 Thus productivity growth in a country is proportional
to the growth in the stock of ideas that have diffused to that country.14
13ng the variable of integration to x =
'p.,'
InA,,t = In(p.,t/x)edx = 8' lnp,,(l —e")—9 J1nxedx.
0 0
Forlarge ,,,,wehave an arbitrarily good apprmdniation,
lnA,,t =9_1Iniii9_1f°°1nredx
The Laplace transform of —— lntis s Ins, where 'isEuler's constant. Evaluating the Laplace transform
at a = 1 implies,
Inzedx = -v'.
Thisgives us the desired result that,
lnA., = g_1 + 5/9.
'4As we discussed in our introduction, our model implies that an idea is more likely to be adopted in a country
with a relatively low level of productivity. The probability that an idea of quality q will prove useful is simply
H.,(qlt). Integrating this probability over the Pareto density of Q, and noting that Iitbecomesarbitrarily
large over time, we get
f Hn(q)F'(q)dq = ==
Consider two countries, m and n, with levels of productivity A,,, and A,, respectively. The probability that
an idea will be adopted in country m relative to the probability that it will be adopted in country n is simply,
(A,,./A,,4'. Thus if A, <A,, country vn will obtain more true innovations than will country n from the
same number of ideas. In this sense the low productivity country draws innovations from the "technology gap".
102.5 Market Structure
We assume that the right to use an invention in country n passes to a local, monopolistic
imitator with a hazard that depends on whether or not the inventor has a patent in that
country. We denote the hazard of imitation if the invention was patented as tandif it was
not patented as Fora patent to. have any value requires, of course, that r° < Ot•Jf
patents provide perfect protection then=0,while if trade secrets are impossible to keep
thenot =15
Whether the rights to the invention are owned by the original inventor or by an imitator,
the owner competes against the state of the art for that input in that country at the time of
invention. We assume that competition is Bertrand. Hence the owner of the invention charges
the highest price at which production using the previous state of the art is tiprofitable)6
15We do not allow the Inventor to wait until the invention is adopted in a country to apply for a patent
there. This aesumption reflects the requirement of most patent systems that patents be taken out in additional
countries within one year of the first, or priority, application. We assume that inventors do not delay seeking a
priority application.
16Grossman and Helpman (1991) make similar assumptions. The production technology implies a unit elastic
demand for an individual input given the prices of all other inputs. Hence to maximize profit the owner of the
invention charges the highest price at which it remains the only seller of that input. We assume that the owner
of the right to use the invention, when the invention is adopted in a country, competes with the state of the art
at the time of invention. The owner of an invention thus blocks protection of any Interim improvement over the
initial state of the art that is dominated by that invention. This assumption is consistent with the requirement
of most patent systems that only ideas that are "state of the art," can receive protection, where "state of
the art" is interpreted to mean the most advanced idea regardless of whether or not it has been adopted for
production This assumption is easier to justify when the original inventor holds a patent than when a domestic
imitator owns the right to the invention. The alternative assumptions that an imitator competes against the
next-best adopted technology, or that imitation is perfectly competitive, both Imply lower mark-ups over direct
production costs for unpatented Inventions. While this implication may be realistic, the consequent asymmetry
in mark-ups between patented and imitated inputs substantially complicates the analysis. Moreover, it implies
that the patent system itself has real effects on productivity conditional on the level of research. To focus
112.6 The Value of an Invention
Our assumptions about price competition imply that a firm producing an input of quality q in
a country where the state of the art for that input at the time of discovery was z will charge
p =(q/z)w,where w is the wage in the country at the time. We use the price of final output
as numeraire. Total purchases of the new input are .Giventhe pricing equilibrium, the
profit to the owner of the right to use a technolo' of quality q improving on an existing input
of quality z is ,r(z,q)=(1
—ifq> z and zero otherwise.
The owner can earn a profit only after the invention has been adopted and only before it
has been surpassed by a more advanced technolor. Consider, then, the expected prcfit in
country n at time a from an invention of quality q at time t < a in country i. The probability
of its having been adopted for production by time a is (1 —'"()). Theprobability of its
not having become obsolete by then is e'', while the probability J its not having
been copied by then is e_(3_t), where k E {pat, not} depending upon whether or not the
invention was patented. At the time t that an invention of quality q occurs in country i, the
expected discounted value of the right to use it in country n, given the existing state of the
art z in the relevant sector, is therefore:
q) = lrnt÷,(z, q)e._(r+L)s(1
—
ifq ￿ z. Otherwise the value is zero. Here again k =patif the idea was patented and k =riot
otherwise,and r is the discount rate, which we treat as constant over time.
2.7 The Decision to Patent
A patent gives the inventor the incremental benefit of a lower hazard of imitation, so is worth
V,(z, q) —V,(z,q). We assume that, at the time of invention, the researcher knows the
on other implications of the international patent system more critical to the analysis here we preclude this
poibilit
12quality of the invention but not the state of the art in the sector to which it will apply in
each country. Integrating over the distribution of the states of the art in country n, given by




where,k =pat,not depending upon whether or not the idea is patented and T(b, 0)1 —
ebbh/oF(!jlb), where b)J'°eZX0 1dx is the incomplete gamma function. Hence, if
it costs an inventor in country I C,t to patent in country n then the inventor will seek patent
protection in that country if Vt(q) —V,j(q)exceeds c, and not otherwise. The return to
patenting rises with the quality of the invention q. Hence the condition:
,pat, ' note\ — q/ — qj —Cnjt 4
determines a threshold quality level jt such that inventions of higher qualtv are patented
while those of lower quality are not.17 We assume that if an invention constitutes an innovation
in a country then a patent is automatically granted.
Since researchers in country i produce ideas at rate the number of patents they
apply for in country n, Pt is:
Pt = (5)
Since the fraction of ideas seeking protection is whilethe fraction that are potentially
useful is the ratio of the number of patented to potentially useful ideas is:
(6)
As we show below, in steady state this ratio is constant.
17A poseibility, of course, is that the ct of patenting would exceed the benefit for any invention regardlese
of its quality, in which case patenting would be zero, and i, infinite. At the other extreme, if c =0then
=1,ao that any idea would be patented.
132.8 The Return to R&D
The value of an invention of quality q from country i in country n is the maximum of V,t(q) —
C,utand V,(q). The expected value of an idea in that country before its quality is known is
therefore the expectation of this amount across all possible values of q, which is:
V,t = V,(q)F'(q)dq + 100V,t(q)FF(q)dq
— (7)
1
where,as before, F'(q) =Oq_(1)is the Pareto density. The expected return to an idea of




This amount represents the expected return to a unit of R&D effort.
2.9 Equilibrium R&D
The marginal researcher in country i, ranked Rj, can expect to earn doing
research. Equilibrium in the labor market thus implies that the number of researchers l? in
country i will solve: 'R '' Iit
ctf3Va—j= w,.j, (9) \J'itl
wherewit is what a marginal researcher would earn producing output.
2.10 Technology, Wages, and Income
The wage in the production sector of country i is proportional to the level of productivity
in that country. Bertrand competition implies that the mark-up over this wage, MU)
p(j)/w, is low in sectors where the currently adopted input is only marginally better than the
input it replaced while M(j) is large in those sectors where the current input is a substantial
improvement over its predecessor. Since expenditure on each input is the same, more labor
14is allocated to the production of inputs with low mark-ups. Consequently, the wage, as well
as productivity, is lower than would be the case if production workers were equally allocated
among sectors. As we show in the appendix, the mark-up M is a random variable with a
time-invariant distribution with density:
0m1 I8m0
g(m;O) • him—i m —i —1




The value of total output equa's wage costs plus profits. Again, taking into account the
distribution of the mark-up, the value of output in country i, given the wage and the labor







The appendix provides the derivation of the expressions for g(m; 0), the wage, and the value
of output.
We have now fully specified our modeL To summarize, equation (1) relates R&D effort to
subsequent growth of technology in different countries. Equation (4) determines whatideas
are patented given the value of output. Equations (7), (8), and (9) determine thedivision of
the labor force in a country between production and research and development as a function
of the wage in that country and output levels around the world. Finally, equation (10) relates
15the wage in a country to its level of technology while equation (11) relates a countrys output
to its level of technology and the size of its labor force engaged in production.
We treat the total labor force in each country as exogenous. The state of the economy
at any moment can be described in terms of the N technology parameters p, which evolve
according to (1). The economy is in equilibrium when, taking as given the current and future
state of the economy, patenting and labor allocation decisions are individually optimal, as
implied by (4) and (9).
3 The Steady State
The economy is in steady state when the state variables p grow at a constant common rate,
which we denote g, and patenting is constant. In order to obtain a steady-state outcome we
make the following assumptions about exogenous variables:
(i) Total labor forces in each country are constant. Hence=LV t.
(ii) The productivity of researchers is proportional to the current level of technology where
they work, so that the number of new ideas generated by a given research effort is proportional
to the stock of existing ideas.18 Specifically, we assume that kjt =apit.
(iii) Patenting costs are a constant proportion of output, that is=
equivalent assumptionis made in many other models of endogenous growth, as, for example, in Krugrnan
(1979) and in Grossman and Helprnan (1901). With constant labor forces this assumption is needed for the
economy to grow in steady state. Technologies and ideas would also grow if labor forces grew at a constant
positive rate nandresearch productivity were given by a, =a7y[0,1). Ideas and technology would then
grow at rate n/(1 —.y).Kortum (1994) develops a model with tle features (with 7=0) for a dosed economy.
'5This assumption is equivalent to assuming that examining a patent requires a constant labor input whose
cost is passed on to the applicant. If productivity growth were reflected in lower patenting costs, eventually all
nsw ideas, no matter how bad, would be patented. Since we observe a rate of domestic patenting that is not
growing over time (with the exception of Japan), we find it reasonable to assume that patenting costs have not
been falling relative to market size.
16Two features of a steady state are: (1) a constant number R, of workers in each country
engaged as researchers; and (ii) patenting thresholds that are proportional to the destination
country's productivity, Le., constant values ofas defined by equation (6).
From equation (1), given the constant number of researchers R1 and labor force L in each
country, the steady-state growth rate of technology and the steady-state relative technology






£.—_i n$ + 9 J
The solution to this system gives the world rate of productivity growth, A/A =g/O and
relative productivity levels,
/f/Znt\ —=—j, n=1,...,N—1. ANt \PNLJ
From equation (4), given the growth rate g, patenting thresholds b,j aredeter-
mined by the N2 equations:
T(b,6){[W(P6t/g, b) — W((+)/g, b)1
—
[W(i0L/g, ) — ru)/g. )1}= (13)
where:
k=pat,rot,
17—as —be'20 and W(a/g, b)gJ°°eeds. Note that the only country characteristics that directly
affect the patenting threshold are the adoption lag e,, the strength of patent protection rates
as reflected by i°and andthe cost of patenting c,u. In particular, br does not depend
on the levels of technologyand
Insteady state, the expected value of an idea of unknown quality from country i in country
n, Vt, will be a constant proportion v of country n's output Yt divided by its level of
technology tint, that is,
—1 V,t=
where:
=(J9)1{jL T(b, 9)[(/g, b) —((P0t +)/g,b)]db
+ f00T(b,6)[W(0t/g,6)
— +e)/g, b)]db} —
where: -
F+gk=pat,not.
As is the case with ,vdepends on the adoption lag, the strength of intellectual property
protection, and the cost of patenting, but not on technology levels. The steady-state return
to doing research to the R1th researcher in country i is thus:
: Lnt
while the return to producing output is simply wjj.
order to compute this integral, we rely on the result that for 6>0,
4'(a/g, 6) =6"r(—a/g,6).
As a consequence, we also have
T(b,8) =1—be$(!j_,b).
There is a continued fraction representation for the incomplete gamma function (that admits d <0) leading to
a speedy numerical algorithm [from Press et. a1. (1989), pp. 160-163].
18Substituting equations (10) and (11), the condition for steady-state labor market equilib—
rium in each country, from (9), becomes:2'
—R)()(1_0)b8=?C2(O). (14)
To summarize, the N(N + 2) equations (12), (13) and (14) determine the steady-state growth
rate 9, N —1relative technology levels p, N2 patenting thresholds ,andN levels of R&D,
R. Given, R, (12) determines g and z. Given g, (13) determines .Giveng, 6, and p, (14)
determines R.
How much patenting is done in steady state? Substituting the relevant steady-state magni-
tudes into equation (5) implies that the steady-state number of patents applied for by inventors
from country i in country n is:
D._ fl4 — p.In
As technology advances researchers become more productive, so more ideas are produced. But
as technology advances a smaller percentage of these new ideas constitute improvements in the
state of the art, so are worth patenting. In steady state these two effects cancel out, yielding
a constant rate of patenting.
4 Calibration
We assume that the steady state of our model describes, in 1988, world proc. activity growth,
relative levels of productivity, numbers of researchers, and foreign and domestic patenting
21Since v,,,, is independent of technologr levels, an implication of thisexprionis that the elastkity of R&D
with respect to the level of technology has the sign of 1-9. Researchers in countries with more advaneed
technologies, as measured by ,areproportionately more productive as researchers, but their opportunity cost
of doing research is also greater in proportion to Thenet effect is more research in advanced countries if 9
exceeds one and lese otherwise.
19among Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Japan and the UnitedStates. In this section
we let the data from these economies determine a vector of parameters, includingdiffusion
parameters, for our theoretical model
4.1 Solving the Model
The steady-state equations of the model can be represented as
y= c(e,x),
wherey is a vector of observable endogenous variables, eisa vector of parameters, and x
is a vector of exogenous variables. The function G(.) represents the simultaneous solution of
equations (12), (13), and (14) as well as the productivity and patenting equations: (3) and
(15).
We assume that all patent systems are the same, but allow them to provide different degrees
of protection to nationals than to foreigners. Hence we define £0tasthe imitation rate when an
invention is patented domestically and tasthe imitation rate when an invention is patented
abroad. The hazard of imitation of unpatented inventions "°isthe same everywhere.
We assume that the rate of diffusion of inventions from country I to country n is the
product of a parameter governing the speed at which county n adopts new inventions, a
parameter governing the speed at which inventions from country i are ready for adoption,
and a parameter governing the percentage increase in adoption speed for domestic inventions.
Formally,= wherewe normalize=Iand D =1if ,ii. This we require ten
parameters to account for the 25 diffusion rates between and within our five countries.
22We ha choei the five countrie. because of their size and research intensity together they employ over
80 percent of the world'. research scientists and engineers. Furthermore, each of these five countries obtain.
between 70% and 80% of its foreign patent applications from one of the other four. About 60% of the world's
Cross Domestic Product (CDP) is produced in these countries (Summers and Heston (1991)). Hence our five
countries account for most of the world's inventive activity and a majority of the market for inventions.
20In summary, we search for 17 parameters
pat pat 8 = [r, 0, j3, J, a, L'D'F ,ci,, e.5,1., ., 4.,
The values of the exogenous variables,
[Li, -. . , L5,Cfl,., C4,., C55]1,
are shown in table 1. The workforce in each country L is taken from Summers and Heston
(1991). The patenting costs are based on country specific filing fees, agents fees, and translation
costs taken from Helfgott (1993). To obtain the c we divide the application costs by the
adjusted GDP of the country charging the application fee.24 We fix the interest rate at 7%
based on historical real returns on the U.S. stock market.
There are 35 endogenous variables in the model,
y[A/A, Ait/At, .. . , At/At,R1,. .., R,Pa,. .. , Pr,.,P551"
as shown in table 2.
23Th costs were adjustedforJapanese domestic applications. The Japanese applyforover 300,000 patents
domestically each year. Okads (1992) finds that Japanese patents gra.nt.ed to foreigners contain on average 4.9
times as many inventive claims as those granted to Japanese inventors. Thus we translate 4.9 Japanese domestic
patent applications into the equivalent of 1 application elsewhere. This adjustment is reflected in table 2. We
also scale up the cost of an application for a Japanese inventor in Japan by this same factor of 4.9. We ignore
the more complicated fee atn.cture applying to patents through the European Patent Office and complications
introduced by patent renewal fees.
24Helfgott collected the cost of application data from a survey in 1992 and converted all the figures into $tY.S.
using the exchange rate in effect unear the end of 1992". We took 1992 GDP in local currencies from iMP
(1994). We then converted GDP into $U.S. using 1992 fourth quarter exchange rates from IMP (1994) and we
subtracted from GDP the share o(GDP spent on R&D, from OECD (1991). Since we ignore patent renewal foes
and the pible cost of disclosure of information in taking out a patent, our measure of the cost of patenting
is a lower bound on the true costs. To check the aenitivity of results to substantially higher application costs
we experimented with increasing all foreign patenting costs by $10,000. There were no substantially different
implications for diffusion.
21Our measure of productivity A is manufacturing output per hour takr fromvan Ark
and Punt (1993). We calculate productivity growth by averaging over our five countries from
1979-1989. We use manufacturing productivity to represent a country's overall technological
capability since productivity may be poorly measured in other sectors.
To measure research effort 1? we use research and development scientists and engineers
employed by the business sector in each country in 1988. To eliminate the effect of defense
related research we multiply these employment numbers by the fraction of business sector
R&D financed by either the business sector or from abroad. All data on researchare from
OECD (1991).
Patent applications by country of application and resident of inventor in 1988(Pm) are
from WIPO (1990). As mentioned in the footnote above, patent applications inJapan by
Japanese inventors have been scaled down by a factor of 4.9. Since patent law requires that
an inventor apply for a patent in any other country within a year of the first (or priority)
application, patent applications rather than grants capture better the inventor'spatenting
decision in our modeL Moreover, applications rather than grants are muchmore comparable
across countries.
In order to evaluate the plausibility of a givenparameter vector O,weneed to thmpare
the predictions of the model,= C(O, z),with the actual value of the endogenous variable,
y. We have written a computer algorithm to do this.25
We solvethemodel using GAUSS. The program begins with a parameter vector and aguess for the the
growth rate of technology, g. Then, (1) it finds the set of b, that solve equation (13); (ii) it iterates between
equations (12) and (14) until it finds technology levels and research employments thatare '3sistent with each
other; (lii) it uses (12) to obtain a new value for the growth of technology; (iv) with theflew value of git returns
to the beginning of step (i). These steps are repeated until the growth oftechnology stops changing. FInally,
equations (3) and (15) are used to infer productivity and patenting. The entireprocse takes about 1 minute
on a Pentium PC.
224.2 Baseline Parameters
We choose baseline parameters to match the steady-state values of the variables impliedby the
model as closely as possible to our measures of the endogenous variables. Hencewe minimize
the distance function, EI . whereöisthe weight placed on variable j.Ourthirty-
five endogenous variables consist of five productivity variables (four relative productivities and
productivity growth), research scientists and engineers in the five countries, and twenty-five
patent levels between countries. In order to give each type of variable equal weight we choose
5,= lforj= 1,...,lOandô3=1/5forj= 11,...,35.26
The parameters that fit best are shown in table 3. Our estimate of 0 is somewhat aboveone,
implying that, other things equal, the return to research relative to production is greater in
more advanced countries. We obtain a very small value for the parameter fi of the distribution
of research talent. This result suggests that research output is roughly proportional to the
workforce in each country with only a small effect from the fraction of the workforce engaged
in research. While we find that domestic patents virtually preclude imitation, foreignpatents
provide very little protection. This reflects the fact that the home country is always the most
popular country in which to seek protection (by at least a factor of 2, see table 2). Our
imitation rates are lower than those reported by Levin et. al. (1987), although theirconcept
of imitation seems to encompass our notion of obsolescence as well.
Thrning to diffusion rates, we find them to be considerably more rapid within than between
countries. For example, the rate of domestic diffusion in the United States is 0.03, while from
the United States to Japan it is 0.003. For inventions from Japan, the rate of domestic
diffusion is 0.17 while the rate of diffusion to the United States is 0.02. Though the implied
mean diffusion lags are large, they are consistent with the results of micro 'nomcstudies
Th calculate baseline parameters we nested our algonthrn for solving the steady state of our model fora
given parameter vector within &standardminirni7tjon routine. txsing the AMOEBA non derivative routine
minimization took several days on a Pentium PC.
23summarized in Jovanovic and Lach (l993).
Table 4 shows how the model performs at fitting the vector of endogenous variables. The
model is highly successful at fitting overall productivity growth, relative productivity levels,
and levels of research employment in each country. Patterns of international patenting are less
successfully captured though the overall level of patenting is about right.
5 Decompositions and Counterfactuals
Our estimates allow us to decompose the sources of growth in each country into what originates
from domestic research and what originates from research in each of the other four countries.
We also decompose the return to invention in each country into what is earned from the home
market and from each of the other four. We then examine the implications of different amounts
of international diffusion, and of different levels of intellectual property protection.
5.1TheSources of Growth
Through the process of international technology diffusion, research done in one country leads to
productivity growth elsewhere. Table 5 quantifies these links between countries. The European
countries derive most of their growth from abroad while the United States and Japan obtain
slightly more from domestic research. Japan, Germany, and the United States make the largest
contributions to growth. A surprising result is that Germany and Japan each contributemore
than the United States. Though the United States producesmany more inventions, we find
that these inventions diffuse quite slowly.
27iovanovicand Lathsconcept of the diffusion rate is the rate at whk.h the market for a product reaches ita
potentiaL Our concept Ii the hazard rate until a product is adoptnd.
245.2 The Rewards to Research
While the growth decomposition in table 5 looks at foreign countries as sources of new technol-.
ogy, table 6 looks at foreign countries as markets for new technology. We calculate the fraction
of the average value of an invention arising from markets in each of the 5 courtries. Inventions
obtain almost all their value domestically, even for the smaller European economies.
5.3 Alternative Patterns of Diffusion
Another way to quantify the role of international technology diffusion is to ask how the steady
state of the model would differ if technological links between countries were reduce<i The
results of several such experiments are shown in table 7. For comparison, we repeat the
predictions of the model from table 4 under the column "Baseline." Our first experiment,
"Technological isolation", reduces to 0.0001 the rate of diffusion between the United States
and the block of four other countries. Since the block of four other countries grows faster on
its own than does the United States, the U.S. level of productivity must fall relative to the
other countries (by a factor of more than 10) before the resulting technology gap supports the
new steady state growth rate. The new growth rate is about 90 per cent of the baseline
value. Our second experiment, "Borderless diffusion" eliminates the effect of country borders
on diffusion rates. In particular, we set D =9.77even if ni. Since ideas now spread
more rapidly and evenly across countries, the world growth rate rises and productivity levels
becomes more tightly clustered around the U.S. level Research employment is stimulated,
particularly in the smaller countries (Germany, France, and the U.K.) which now have a much
larger effective market for their inventions.
21Thua, in the now steady state the United State. Is not unnpietely isolated since it obtatna many innovations
from abroad, aibeit years later.
255.4 The Strength of Patent Protection
We conclude with some counterfactual experiments on the strength of patent protection. In the
first experiment we eliminate all forms of patent protection by settingandequal to t"°,
i.e.,the hazard of imitation of patented ideas is as great as unpatented ones. With i3 nearly
zero, it is predictable that world productivity growth would not change drastically, although
research employment falls considerably. The drop in research employment is particularly
pronounced in Japan and the United States, which have large domestic markets. In the
pat pat second experiment, we make patent protection perfect by setting D and LFequalto zero,
so that there is no hazard of imitation if an invention is patented. World productivity growth
is higher by a modest factor of 1.003, although research employment more than doubles.29
6 Conclusion
We have developed a model of the invention and the international diffusion of technology that
allows us to identify the sources of growth and the sources of rewards to innovation in the world
economy. While our model is complex, it nevertheless embodies several crucial simplifications.
First, we have ignored capital accumulation. We implicitly assume that capital is perfectly
mobile among the countries we consider. An implication is that, while capital deepening and
productivity growth are correlated, capital deepening is not the force driving growth. Capital
moves endogenously to take advantage of technological improvement.
Tbese results should not be Interpreted to mean that intellectual property protection is undesirable. Present
value calculations indicate that very small changes in growth rates have large effects on permanent income. At
the same time, since the number of research adentlats and engineers is small relative to the total labor force,
large percentage changes in research employment imply very small percentage changes in current output. For
example, our calculations indicate that the magnitude of the steady-state income gain due to higher growth
from perfect patent protection is roughly comparable to the amount of steady-state income Icet from diverting
production workers to research.
26Second, we have ignored the terms of trade by treatin.g intermediate inputs as nontraded.
Changes in the terms of trade may be an important means by which the benefits of productivity
growth diffuse internationally.
Finally, we have not examined the out-of-steady-state implications of our modeL An
outstanding question is whether convergence to the steady state of our model can explain the
convergence of productivity levels exhibited by the countries in our sample riuring the post
World War II period. A puzzle posed by Jones (1993) is that the growth in research scientists
and engineers during this period was accompanied by a falling rate of productivitygrowth.
While there are many explanations for this finding, one that is consistent withour framework
is that the research effort that accompanied World War II left the world with a pool ofmany
good ideas. The subsequent absorption of these ideas into productive technology would then
explain the exceptionally high growth rate in the two decades after the Second World War.
We leave the examination of this hypothesis for future research.
We view our current work as only a first step in the empirical general equilibriummodeling
of technology creation and diffusion in the world economy. While suggestive,our estimates
should be interpreted with caution since we fit our model to a small amount of data froma
small number of countries. Firm conclusions can only follow experimentation with alternative
methodologies and richer data. Nonetheless, our analysis provides insights that are likely to
survive further scrutiny. One broad conclusion is that technology among the major research
economies diffuses much more slowly between countries than within them, yeteven large
countries derive a substantial share of their growth from abroad.
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31A List of Symbols
Y Output in country n at time t.
J Range of inputs, jE[0, J].
X(j) Quantity of input jincountry n at time t.
Z(j) State of the art of input jincountry n at time t.
Workforcein country n at time t.
ant Productivity of researchers in country ii at time t.
Parameterof the distribution of research talent.
Researchers in country ia at time t.
Q Randomvariable representing the quality of an idea.
F(q) Distribution from which the quality of an idea is drawn.
0 Parameter of the quality distribution, F(q) =I—q9.
r Randomdiffusion lag.
Rate of diffusion from country i to n.
Stock of ideas that have diffused to country 'a by time t.
H(zt) Cumulative distribution of the state of the art in country iiattime t.
At Level of productivity in country n at time t.
ii' Euler's constant ( .5772.)
pat Rateof imitation in country n if invention is patented.
Rate of imitation in country n if invention is not patented.
pnt(j) Price (in units of output) of input jincountry n at time t.
Wage (in units of output) of production workers in country n at time t.
ir(z,q) Profit from marketing input of quality q in country ia at
time t if the next best input has quality z.
q) Expected discounted value as of time tincountry ia of an invention
32from country i where the invention has quality q and replaces an
input of quality z.Theindex k =pat,notspecifiesif it is patented.
r Discountrate.
V,(q) Expected value of q) before the sector (hence z) is known.
c,. Cost of seeking protection in country n from country i at time t.
qnit Cut-off quality to patent from country i
in country n on an idea invented in t.
P,t Number of ideas from country i seeking protection in a at time t.
Defined as t(constantin steady state.)
Expected value of an invention from country i in country a at time
t, unconditional on its quality.
V*t Expected value of an invention from country i at time t.
g Steady-state growth rate of ,thestock of diffused ideas.
W(a/g,b) Integral defined as gJ0eae9Jds.
Normalized value of an invention from country i in country a
defined as Vz,j/Y,d.
ic1(O) Termrelating productivity index to the wage.
'2(O) Averagevalue of the inverse of the mark-up of input prices over
the cost of producing them.
y Vector of endogenous variables.
x Vector of exogenous variables.
8 Vector of parameters.
33B Mathematical Appendix
We derive the time invariant probability density for the mark-up of input price over marginal
cost (the wage) across sectors. This density shows up in our equation for the wage conditional
on productivity (10) and our equation for the value of output conditional on the wage and the
workforce in production (11). We begin by deriving those equations.










But,if we know the density g of M we have,
.oo J'I lnM(j)dj= Ilnmg(rn;O)dm. Jo Ji





Therefore, since wages plus profits equal the value of output,
Yjm19(m;0)dm =w(L-R).
Deriving the functional form of g(m; 9) requires several steps. As we have defined it, the
mark-up for input jata given time is equal to the quality of that input relative to the quality
of the input that it surpassed. We begin by deriving the joint density for new innovations
of the mark-up and the state of the art surpassed, denoted l(m, zit).Wethen integrate over
all past cohorts of innovations to obtain the distribution of the mark-up for those innovations
that are still in use.
34First consider the distribution of the state of the art surpassed by innovations adopted at
time t.Thiswill not be the same as the distribution of the qualities of all inputs currently in
use, equation (2), since low quality inputs are more likely to be surpassed than high quality
inputs. Formally, we have,
Pr[Z ￿ zQ ￿ Z,il= Pr[Z￿ z,Q ￿ ZIt]/Pr[Q ￿ Zt] =
whereF(z)1 —x9 is the distribution from which the quality of ideas is drawn and H'(xlt) =
is the density of the state of the art, the derivative of equation (2). Integrating
out the denominator under the assumption that pjbecomesarbitrarily large, we find that the
density of the state of the art that is surpassed by innovations adopted at time t is,
Without regard to the state of the art surpassed, the mark-up of an innovation adopted at time
t is drawn from the Pareto distribution. To see this, let z be the state of the art surpassed,







Therefore, multiplying the density of the state of the art surpassed by the density of the
mark-up conditional on the state of the art surpassed,
l(m, nt) =O2pm_0_1z_0+1)e_.
The derivation above tells us about the distribution of the mark-up for new innovations.
To calculate the distribution of the mark-up for all inputs currently in use we need to keep
track of the mark-up for innovations adopted years earlier that are still in use. This is made
possible by the fact that the hazard rate faced by these earlier innovations depends on their
quality, i.e. the product of their mark-up and the state of the art they surpassed. It is for this
reason that we derived the joint density. The other ingredient is the rate at which innovations
were being adopted in earlier periods. This is simply the rate at which ideas were diffusing
35at time a multiplied by the fraction of those ideas that were useful at that time, i.e. z,/t,.
Combining these results, the distribution of the mark-up is,
G(m'Ii) =j j.m J0O i(,n,zl3)e_t_)m)dzdmds. -ooJ,1 1
Changingthe variable of integration from z to
x = + — z9(m,a,
and, noting that (m, a, t) becomes arbitrarily large over time, the inner-most integral is
a, t)2m(9'). Thus, changing the order of integration,
G(m'It)= f''OmO+ Lt a, t2dsdrrz.




After some rearranging, we see that the argument of this integral is exactly g(rn; 9), the density
of the mark-up.
36Table 1: Exogenous Variables
Germany France U.K. Japan U.S.
Labor Force
(millions) 29 25 28 61120
Adjusted CDP
(S billions) 1751 12999213662 5876
Application costs






paid by inventors from:
1066 1066 10663066 1066
992 992 992 3042 992
1200 1200 12004020 1200
47724772 477295904772
3390 3440 13904210 1390
Sources: Laborforce is from Sununers and Heston (1991).
Adjusted CDP is from IMF (1994) with RkD expenditure from
OECD(1991) subtracted. Costs of filing a patent application
(including translation and agents fees) are from Helfgott (1993).
The cost for a Japanese inventor filing an application in Japan
is scaled up by a factor of 4.9 (see text for the rationale).
The ratio of application costs to adjusted GDP is assumed
to be exogenous and constant in steady state.
37Table 2: Endogenous Variables
Germany FranceU.K. JapanU.S.
Productivity growth
in manufacturing 0.0350.0350.0350.035 0.035
Relative productivity leve]s
in manufacturing 0.82 0.760.58 0.82 1
Adjusted research employment











121794590 24098 11371 17279
724625122407 62884 15374
12483 49015805 29613 75632
Sources: Manufacturing value added per hour is from
Van Ark(1992). ResearchemploymentisR&D RSE's
employed in the business sector, OECD (1991) adjusted by
by the fraction of business sector R&D which
is financed by either the business sector or from abroad.
Patent applications are from WIPO (1990). Domestic applications
in Japan are scaled down by a factor of 4.9 (see text).
All data are 1988 values with the exception of productivity growth,
which we average across countries from 1979-1989.
38Table 3: Fitted Parameters
Definition SymbolFitted value
Parameter of search distribution0 1.60
Parameter of talent distributionfi 0.0 12
Number of markets (millions)J 0.17
Research productivity 0.00015
Imitation rates:
if not patented 0.226
if patented at home 0.000












Diffusion rate domestic 9.77
We parameterizeas E,1.e.jq where Dtakeson
the value 1 if ,ii and the value in the last
row of the table if n =i(we normalize=1).
39Table 4: Model Fit
Endogenous variable Actual Prediction
Productivity growth
0.035 0.036









































The full set of 25 patent predictions are available from the
authors.
Table 5: Growth Decomposition




Due to research performed in:










0.14 0.03 0.06 0.19 0.58Table 6: Invention Value Decomposition
Fraction of invention value
from markets in:
For inventions originating in:











Columns may not sum to 1 due to rounding.

























In "Baseline" we repeat the predictions of the model from
table 4.
In "Technological isolation" we set the diffusion rates
between the U.S. and the other 4 countries equal to 0.0001.
Since these diffusion rates are not zero, the U.S. still grows
at the same rate as the other 4 countries in steady state.
In "l3orderless diffusion" we set ED= 9.77even
forn i.
41Table 8: Experiments with the Strength of Patent Protection
























In "Baseline" we repeat the predictions of
table4.
In"No patent protection" we set all imitation rates equal to = .226.
In"Perfect patent protection" we set all imitation rates, conditional
on patenting, equal to 0.
42